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Note: Marv's exact whereabouts between September 28 - November 28, 1943, are unknown.  What is known is that he arrived overseas on September 28, 1943 (likely in North Africa), he sent a V-mail Christmas card to his family from Italy dated November 28, 1943 (c/o Postmaster  New York, New York), and he was wounded in Italy on December 8, 1943.  I have not been able to determine the exact date on which he joined up with his assigned 34th Infantry Division in Italy or his assigned 135th Infantry Regiment, which was part of the 34th Infantry Division.  My guess is that he joined up with his unit near the end of November because (1) the 34th Infantry Division casualty rates were so high (i.e., since Marv was at very high risk of being wounded, he likely spent limited time with his division before being wounded) and (2) a newspaper article on the death of a soldier who had lived on the same Detroit street as Marv, Pvt. William Smith, stated that Smith went overseas in September 1943 (as did Marv) and to Italy two months later [which would have been November 1943].  It's likely that Smith is the same person named Smitty in Marv's August 16, 1943, letter from Camp Shenango; Smitty was at Camp Shenango at or around the same time as Marv.  Therefore, if Smith's (a.k.a Smitty?) travel from the U.S. to Italy was typical for an Army soldier during this time, Marv may not have arrived in Italy until the end of November 1943.  NF

 

November 2-4, 1943, Third Volturno River Crossing, 45th Division:  Getting the 34th and 45th Divisions westward across the VOLTURNO RIVER was designed to help the 3rd Division take the MIGNANO GAP and open the way for an advance to CASSINO and beyond.  While the 3rd Division fought in the immediate vicinity of MIGNANO, the 34th Division was to cross the river and attack into broken ground around COLLI, about five miles away, in order to anchor securely the right flank of the corps.  The 504th Parachute Infantry--operating still on the right flank in terrain so difficult that it was necessary often to communicate by carrier pigeon and sometimes to send food and ammunition by overhead trolley strung across deep mountain gorges--would lend assistance by cutting the VENEFRO-ISERNIA road.

 

Pushed continually by General Clark, who insisted that there were few enemy troops on the far side of the river, General Lucas just as frequently requested more time to prepare.  He saw no point in incurring unnecessary casualties.  Reluctantly, Lucas set the night of November 2nd for the crossing, though he later had to postpone the 34th Division operation for a day to give Ryder additional time to reconnoiter and get more artillery into supporting positions.

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To the troops taking cover among the olive groves on the slopes overlooking the flat valley of the upper VOLTURNO River, the view to the west was far from comforting.  Just beyond the river in the foreground lay Highway 85 and a parallel railroad to VENAFRO.  Beyond those rose rugged and towering mountains.  There the Germans, who had destroyed bridges and spread mines behind them, had to be waiting for those who would cross.

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The first troops to ford the upper VOLTURNO River in this third crossing of the river by VI Corps were from the 45th Division.  During the night of November 2nd, concealed by darkness, the men of Company F, 180th Infantry, moved through clumps of willows to the water, waded the shallow stream, and took up positions high on a terraced hillside to form a covering.  During the afternoon and evening of November 3rd troops of the 4th Ranger Battalion crossed the river with little trouble.  Following a steep and rocky trail in single file, the men climbed into the hills, moving west toward Highway 6.  About the same time the rest of the 2nd Battalion, 180th Infantry, cross the gravel bed of the river downstream, struggled up steep ridges, and advanced northwest toward the village of CEPPAGA.  Upstream from the crossing sites of the 45th Division, 180th Infantry, the 179th Infantry had sent its 3rd Battalion across the VOLTURNO very early on November 4.  The 1st and 2nd Battalions had meanwhile cross the river and come forward.  (See Map 25)

November 3-6, 1943, Third Volturno River Crossing, 34th Division:  The immediate objectives of the 34th Divsion across the wide VOLTURNO RIVER, to the right of the 45th Division, were the villages of SANTA MARIA OLIVETO and ROCCARAVINDOLA in the hills to the northwest.  (See Map 26)

 

168th and 133rd Infantry Regiments.  Shortly before midnight on November 3, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 168th Infantry, and the 133rd Infantry moved carefully down out of the hills and through the farms of the muddy valley to their positions along the low river banks.  Men of the 133rd Infantry spread out in the vineyards and orchards of the delta formed by the junction of the SAVA RIVER and the VOLTURNO RIVER. The divisional artillery opened up at 11:30 p.m. with a terrific concentration on enemy positions across the river and in the hills. The infantrymen, waiting on the banks of the river, could see great flashes through the murk of the night and could hear the crash of exploding shells which continually beat back and forth across the valley, dying away like the distant rumble of thunder. Thirty minutes later, a few hours after the first troops of the 45th Division had crossed on their left, the men of the 168th Infantry and 133rd Infantry (34th Division) waded through the swift and cold waters of the Volturno River for the third and last time.  (See Map 26)

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135th Infantry Division.  On November 4, enemy bombs fell in the vicinity of the 3rd Batallion, 135th Infantry.  Antitank Company cleared a number of S-mines [see images below] from their area.  The location of enemy mines seemd to be peculiarly marked by felling a small tree in the direction of the fields.  On this day, the 3rd Battalion (135th Infantry) was ordered to relieve the 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry, in the vicinity of RAVI DEPPA CAPPELLA.  The AT [antitank?] guns and Chemical mortars attached to the 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry, were to remain in position until the following day (Nov 5).​

 

The 3rd Battalion, 135th Infantry, completed the relief of the 1st Batallion, 168th Infantry, the next morning (Nov 5) and was ordered to patrol the east bank of the VOLTURNO RIVER north to the the 27-grid line to determine enemy positions and installations and clear out any small pockets of resistence.  One gun position was located and an enemy patrol of 10-men was observed moving northeast towary MACCHIA.  The area in rear of the 135th Infantry CP [Command Post?] was again bombed causing some casualties in the supporting artillery.  

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During daylight of November 5th, the 1st Battalion began the 135th Infantry's THIRD CROSSING OF THE VOLTURNO RIVER under intermittant artillery fire just south of ROCCARAVINDOLA.  That night the 2nd Battalion (135th Infantry) closed into an assembly area south of S. MARIA OLIVETO receiving some enemy small arms and mortar fire.  The following morning, November 6, the 3rd Battalion (135th Infantry) crossed the river and closed November 6 in the flat ground just east of ROCCARAVINDOLA.  (See Map 26)

Above: Third and Final Crossing of the VOLTURNO RIVER by the 34th Division, November 3-5, 1943.

  • The 133rd Infantry and 168th Infantry completed the crossings the night of Nov. 3/4.

  • The 135th Infantry completed the crossing Nov. 6.

Above: Detecting German S-Mine ("Bouncing Betty") and Mine Injuries

 

The German S-mine, also known as the "Bouncing Betty" because it jumped into the air before exploding, is the best-known version of a class of mines known as bounding mines.  When triggered, these mines launch into the air and then detonate at about 3 feet.  The explosing projects a lethal spray of shrapnel in all directions.  The S-mine was an anti-personnel mine developed by Germany in the 1930s and used extensively by German forces during World War II.  It was designed to be used in open areas against unshielded infantry.

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Below is an excerpt from “Regimental History of the 135th Infantry” describing the minefields and enemy fire in the areas around ROCCARAVINDOLA and S. MARIA OLIVETO (locations of the 34th Division after it crossed the Volturno River for the third time).

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Antitank Company forded the [Volturno] river with one platoon and went into position at ROCCARAVINDOLA.  The Antitank Mine Plat. [platoon?] removed 60 S-Mines surrounding the building occupied by the Regtl CP [Regimental Command Post?].  The 1st and 2nd Battalions [135th Division] suffered a number of casualties from personnel mines.  Enemy aircraft was active over the are on the 6th [November] but did no bombing or strafing of our troops.  Artillery fire was intense and the 2nd Bn. was subjected to small arms fire in the vicinitiy of S. MARIA OLIVETO, which had not been cleared.  The Germans seemed to have done an excellent job of mining the area.  All likely biovouc areas and covered avenues of approach were heavily mined, and the canalized approaches to the enemy were effectively interdicted by artillery mortar fire.

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Below is are excerpts from The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944 by RIck Atkinson, 2007, page 253.

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Mines made it much worse.  "All roads lead to Rome," Alexander quipped, "but all the roads are mined."  So were footpaths, lovers' lanes, alleys, goat trails, streambeds, shortcuts, and tracks, beaten and unbeatern.  "I never had a moment that I didn't worry abaout mines and booby traps," a 7th Infantry officer said.  Forty percent of Fifth Army battle casualties in early November [1943] came from  mines. "Watch where you step," Clarks' headquarters advised, "and have no curiosity at all."

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North of the Volturno [River], "you could follow our battalions by the blood-stained leggings, the scattered equipment, and the bits of bodies where men had been blown up," the 168th Infantry [of the 34th Division] reported.  


"A man's foot is usually blown loose at the ankle, leaving the mangled foot dangling on shredded tendons," an Army physician noted in his diary.  "Additional puncture wounds of both legs and groin make the agony worse."  A combat medic later wrote, "Even though you'd give them a shot or two of morphine, they would still scream."  In a minefield, Bill Mauldin observed, "an old many thinks of his eyes and a young man grabs for his balls."

November 5-30, 1943:  After crossing the VOLTURNO RIVER for the third time (Nov, 3-6), the next mission, of the 135th Infantry was to secure the town of MONTAQUILA. (See Map 28)

 

Meanwhile, Lt. Gen. Mark Clark's plan called for his infantry divisions to force the Mignano Gap and then converge on the Liri Valley, where tanks could speadhead a run for Roam.  On the Fifth Army's far right, the 34th and 45th Divisions crept through the Apennine crags, using herds of goats to clear highland minefields.  German General Heinrich von Vietinghoff accurately observed of his American adversary: "Every step forward into the mountainous terrain merely increased his difficulties" (Source: The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944, by Rick Atkinson, page 260.)

 

The journist Ernie Pyle returned to the front in November after two months at home. Rested if not reinvigorated, he quickly sized up the Italian Campaign.  "The land and the weather were both against us," he wrote.  "The country was shockingly beautiful, and just as shockingly hard to capture from the enemy.  He listened to "shells chase each other through the sky across the mountains ahead, making a sound like cold wind blowin on a winter night."  Pyle found "almost inconveivable misery, " as well as a bemused fortitude.  When a gunner calculated that it cost $25,000 in artillery shells for each enemy soldier killed, one GI asked, "Why woudn't it be better to just offer the Germans'$25,000 to surrender?" (Source: The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944, by Rick Atkinson, page 262.)

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The 34th and 45th Divisions had just reached the first heights on the mountains north of the upper Volturno River by night on November 5.  Harder climbing and stiffer fighting were yet to come.  Ground attacks in this area were preceded and accompanied by tactical bombing of enemy installations and communications. Within a range of fifteen or twenty miles from Venafro Allied fighters and fighter-bombers dropped 150 tons of explosives. However, close support of ground operations was very difficult in this mountainous region, where pilots could not easily distinguish one terrain feature or village from another.

 

Below are highlights from “Regimental History of the 135th Infantry," which describe the 135th Infantry Regiment's activites during this time period. 

  • The original plan for again crossing the VOLTURNO and attacking MONTAQUILA from the East was abandoned and plans made for an attack along the ROCCARAVINDOLA - MONTAQUILA Highway. Mine fields in the valley through this area were reported, and patrols had determined that unimproved roads and trails leading off the main highway were mined.

  • After subsequent battles for several hills, the enemy appeared to be withdrawing West and North through FILIGNANO after the defensive position West of MONTQUILA had been broken.  

  • On the evening of November 8, the 1st Battalion Aid Station had a shell burst on a tree limb directly above, it killed three and wounded 12.  

  • On November 9, the l68th Infantry again took over the area in the vicinity and the 1st Battalion (135th Infantry) moved into position at the mouth of RAVINDOLA GULCH and relieving two platoons of the 2nd Battalion (135th Infantry) in that area.  3rd Battalion (135th Infantry) action was limited to mortar, machine gun and artillery fire.  That night a strong enemy patrol broke through "L" Company's security, killing the platoon leader, Lt. Dailey, and killing or capturing 14 men. The Antitank Company received a direct hit on one gun but lost none of the crew. On the 10th MONTAQUILA and the road south of it received three battalion concentrations and intermittent shelling throughout the night.

  • The 135th Infantry spent November 10, 11, and 12 spent in patrolling north across the RICCHIARO and West towards MELNALLA and SELVONE. Routes through the mined areas were located by driving sheep and goats through the area, and the report of the large mine field north of RICCHIARO was confirmed.

  • On November 14, the 2nd Battalion (135th Infantry) moved West to the vicinity of Hill 710 (054300) and took up a defensive position outposting the road from MENNALLA to SELVONE.

  • On November 17, the 2nd Battalion (135th Infantry) was relieved by the 1st Battalion (135th  Infantry) and moved back into an assembly area at MONTAQUILA.

  • On November 17, the Cannon Company (135th Infantry) fired 936 rounds on known and suspected, targets on Hill 1100.

  • The 135th Infantry devoted the balance of the period to November 28 to patrolling and after each four days the front line Battalion was pulled back to MONTAQUILA and the other two Battalions moved up to the next forward position. At four different times patrols made contact and on two occasions prisoners 'were taken in the town of MENNEALA. Two of our patrols were challenged by German patrols in excellent English.

  • On November 28 and 30, a 30-man patrol from the 1st Battalion (135th Infantry) made contact with the Germans on Hill 760, just West of MENNELLA and returned after losing one man in a fire fight.

  • The rate of fire, beginning at 6:00 a.m. on November 29 was to be one round of 81 mm mortar every six minutes and for the Cannon Company one round every four minutes continuing until the fires were masked by the l68th or, lifted on order. During this operation 1400 rounds of mortar ammunition and. 1900 rounds of 75mm ammunition were fired.   Still resistance in front of the 133rd and 168th limited the advance and the 3rd Battalion was alerted for a motor movement via COLLISCAPOLI for support of, and attachment tom the 133rd; and the 1st Battalion was alerted for movement via POZZILLI - FILIGNANO or the RAVINDOLA GULCH IN support of the 168th. The 2nd Battalion was attached to the 168th for emergency employment.

    • ​During this period, except for the time the 1st Battalion occupied Hill 558, the assalt on MONTAQUILA by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, and the occupation of the forward positions in the MENNELLA-SELVONE Area, the majority of the men were able to have their rolls and hot meals. This was the first time the regiment in either the Wunisian campaign or the Italian campaign had had the assistance of mule pack trains. Trails through the mountainous mined areas were extremely hazardous and difficult. The recruited "mule-skinners," however, did a good job with this new type of transportation in spite of the fact that mule shoe nails and pack equipment were very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.  On two different occasions the courage and valor of the individual skinner in leading and controlling their mules under heavy shell fire prevented the mules from stampeding or losing their valuable cargoes of food and ammunition. At one time the peak of the mule strength was 74 and at that time 45 of them were "non-combatants" because of the lack of mule shoe nails.

      • The “Regimental History of the 135th Infantry” includes names of five soldiers who received the Silver Star as a result of their actions in managing the mules during intense artillery fire.  The following description of one of the soldier's action was common for all five soldiers: "With unusual coolness, courage, and determination, Pvt Ness continued forward, kept control of his frenzied animal that had been hit by a shell fragment, and brought his cargo and animal through."

    • Communication lines were extended and of necessity followed the mule trails closely. Signal equipment had to be packed over the hills and sharp mule hooves and sliding men and animals on the slippery trails frequently took out our own wire lines.

      • Note: Marv must have followed the mule trails.  NF

    • It was impossible to secure socks until the end of the month and considerable foot trouble resulted. On the Battalions coming out of the MENNELLA - SELVONE area evacuated 40 men in 24 hours for various degrees and stages of Trench-foot. During this period the Cannon Company performed excellently and fired during the month 2361 rounds of ammunition.

      • Note: Marv never mentioned having foot trouble.  NF

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Below are excerpts from The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944, by Rick Atkinson, page 265, which described how the terrain, weather, and supply shortages continued to get worse.

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Most troops lacked "the born hill-man's eye for the best way up, down, or across a mountain," as the official British history would conclude.  Instead, "the major tactics of the Allies became, willy-nilly, a head-on battering" that also required enourmous quantities of ammunication and the conversion of combat troops to porters and stretcher bearers.  Will Lang of Life scribbled in his notebook: "Need one man carrying for every two men fighting."

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Worse yet, the battered docks in Naples limited resupply efforts.  Wool clothing scheduled to arrive in mid-October was delayed until mid-November after ammunition took shipping priority. Shortages of tiers, batteries, and spare parts immobilized three of every ten trucks, further hampering quartermasters trying to move material from port to battlefront.  As the frozen corpses on Camino could attest, the Allies were utterly unprepared for winter. Much of the cold-weather gear under development in the States would not reach Italy for another year.  Heavy combat boots would not arrive until February.  British units doubled the blanket allowance from two to four, requisitioned sheepskin coats from Syria, and increased the daily sugar ratio by four ounces for thos fighting at altitudes about two throusand feet.

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Too little, too late.  "Cold ground trauma" injuries soared in November, including the first thousand cases of trench foot among American troops.  

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MAP NO 28

Above: Advance of the 34th and 45th Division, November 6-13, 1943.

  • After crossing the VOLTURNO RIVER for the third time and finaly time, the next mission of the 135th Infantry was to secure the town of MONTAQUILA (upper right corner).

  • While the 34th and 45th Divisions were advancing into the mountains on the right, the 3d Division was driving on MIGNANO and against the heights on either side of the town (not on map).

Above: Artillery Fire Along the VOLTURNO River  00:30

A short, black and white, narrated video clip of Allied soldiers moving along the Volturno River bank and wide shot of Artillery cannons blasting.   Dated Dec. 1, 1943.

Above: Allies Slowed By Flooding In Italy.  0:29

A short, black and white, narrated video clip of Allied soldiers in filed and close up of rushing waters of VOLTURNO RIVER.  Dated Dec. 11, 1943

Above: Infantry Advances and German Prisoners March.  0:33

A short, black and white video clip of Allied infantry shooting and advancing, montage of marching German prisoners along muddy road.  Dated Dec. 1, 1943.

Above: Allied Vehicles Struggle Through Flooding in Italy.  0:32

A short, black and white, narrated video clip of allied solders helping wounded fellow soldier out of the VOLTURNO RIVER.  Dated Dec. 11, 1943.

Above: Rescue at the VOLTURNO RIVER; Collapsed pontoon bridge in the background.

Note: Click on images below for larger versions and captions.

Above: Mule Pack Teams

With the tortuous mountain trails too steep and winding for jeeps to pass, supply problems became acute. personnel became "mule skinners."   Food, ammunition -- everything troops needed for living and fighting -- were hauled up the mountainside on the backs of these mules. 

Above: Problem of "Trenchfoot"

Trench foot is a medical condition caused by prolonged exposure of the feet to damp, unsanitary, and cold conditions.  If left untreated, trench foot usually results in gangrene, which may require amputation.

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Incidence of cold injury among British troops in Italy during 1943-44 was strikingly lower than among United States troops.   Early in the fall of 1943, "trenchfoot" was apparently of so little consequence in British troops that it was not reported at all.  

 

The explanation of these differences is not entirely clear. Among the obvious reasons for the better British showing were the excellent boots with which British troops were provided; the heavy wool socks which they used, in contrast to the lighter socks provided for American troops; the daily sock exchange which was routine in the British Army; the British practice of keeping troops in the line for shorter periods of time than the American practice; and the very strict foot discipline enforced on British troops.  An observer from the Office of the Quartermaster General considered that the British custom of  classifying cold injury, from the disciplinary point of view, as a self-inflicted wound had much to do with the lower British incidence.

November 28, 1943: Marv sent a V-Mail Christmas card to his family from Italy.

November 29, 1943:  While  the X and II Corps were making the main effort against the Camino hill mass (Operation Raincoat), the 34th and 45th Divisions of the VI Corps engaged the enemy north of the MIGNANO.  Intended to divert attention from the CAMINO sector and draw German reserves toward the north, the action began November 29 four days in advance of the main effort.  (See Map 9)   The attack was slow and costly. By December 4, the 34th Division, on the left, had gained about a mile, at a cost of 777 casualties. The 45th continued to inch forward for another five days, taking several important hill positions but making little headway toward its goal.

  • The mission of the 45th Division, comprising the 157th, 179th, and 180th Regimental Combat Teams, was to open a portion of the FILIGNANO-SANT' ELIA road and, by attacking northwest of the road, to support the 34th Division's left flank.

  • Plans for the 45th Division directed that the 179th Infantry would make its initial effort against positions from LA BANITA southward beyond Hill 769, with the dual purpose of supporting the 34th Division's attack further north and of getting astride the road through the mountains to SANT' ELIA.

  • Click here for a short video that explains the battles around the Camino hills, including Mount Lungo, San Pietro, and Mignano Gap (Operation Raincoat).

Note: As summarized at the top of this page, Marv's exact whereabouts between September 28 - November 28, 1943, are unknown.  What is known is that he arrived overseas on September 28, 1943 (likely in North Africa), he sent a V-mail Christmas card to his family from Italy dated November 28, 1943 (c/o Postmaster  New York, New York), and he was wounded in Italy on December 8, 1943.  NF

MAP NO 9

Above: On November 29, 1943, the 135th Infantry was east of MOUNT PANTANO, where it would soon engage in battle.

November 29 - December 3, 1943: To the right of the 45th, the 34th Division (133rd, 135th, 165th Infantries) occupied forward positions along a seven-mile front. Before it on a line extending south from MOUNT MARRONE, across the RIO CHIARO (river), and down to the village of PANTANO, were elements of the 305th Grenadier Division. At the start of the new Allied offensive the 34th Division had as its immediate mission the capture of key heights north and south of CERASULO overlooking the COLLI-ATINA road.   (See Map 11)

MAP NO 11

Above: Battle for MOUNT PANTANO by the 165th Division, November 29 - December 3, 1943.

  • Note: The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of the 135th Infantry  (Marv's likely assigned Infantry) are in reserve to the right of the 168th Infantry.  NF

  • For a detailed description of the attack on MOUNT PANTANO by the 168th Infantry, 34th Division, click here.  

Excerpt from Minnesota Military Museum, History of the 34th "Red Bull" Infantry Division:

"Fighting along the route was as hard and unforgiving as ever to face an army, but the Germans were gradually pushed back as, one by one, the strategic objectives were taken: Monte Pantano, San Vittore, Monte Chiaia, Monte Trocchio, the Rapido River. Bitter hand-to-hand combat was often needed to root the enemy out of his holes in the mountains, and the men frequently fought in regions that could only be supplied by animal pack trains."

Above: On MOUNT PANTANO and the heights beyond, weapons were emplaced on reverse slopes and in ravines to bring fire on any approaching force.  Observation posts controlled fire and gave information to troops.

Above: Near MOUNT PANTANO, northeast of Cassino. December, 1943. On the left: US Brigadier General Theodore ROOSEVELT Jr., who was the Liaison Officer of the 2nd Moroccan Infantry Division, composed mostly of Berber soldiers and French officers.: 

December 4-8, 1943, Mount Pantano, 135th Infantry Division.   In the afternoon of 4 December the 135th Infantry came up to relieve all elements of the 168th on MOUNT PANTANO. During its six-day test of mental and physical endurance on the mountain the 168th Infantry had lost all its battalion commanders, together with 33 other officers and 386 men killed or wounded. It had expended 6,800 rounds of 81-mm mortar ammunition, 3,000 hand grenades, 7,500 rounds of 75-mm ammunition, and 400,000 rounds for rifle and machine gun. Only one knob of MOUNT PANTANO was in our possession.

 

From 5 to 9 December the troops of the 34th Division were occupied in consolidating positions and patrolling. Enemy activity was confined to intermittent interdictory and harassing fire from artillery and mortars. Artillery concentrations hit in the MOUNT PANTANO area late on the 6th and again on the night of December 7/8, when the 135th Infantry received heavy enemy shelling every four or five minutes.

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Marv was wounded on December 8, 1943.

  • Note: According to Marv's disability award, he received the following injuries: nerve injury, weakness of forearm and hand secondary to gunshot wounds left elbow, and gunshot wound left thigh and right knee.  NF

  • Note: Based on the extent of Marv's wounds and a description of how a wounded soldier from the 2d Moroccan Infantry Division was removed from MOUNT PANTANO in Fifth Army At the Winter Line: 15 November 1943 - 15 January 1944, it's likely Marv was carried on a litter "down the difficult slopes of Mount Pantano to the village of Pantano where casualties could be evacuated to hospitals."  NF  

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During December 8 and 9, relief of the entire 34th Division was begun by the 2d Moroccan Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. A. M. F. Dody, which had landed at Naples from November 21 to 30. General Dody formally assumed command of the north sector of the VI Corps front on 10 December, and a fresh division of eager troops, trained in mountain fighting, was ready for the next phase of the attack.

  • Above Left: Litter Bearers of a Moroccan Rifle Regiment carry a wounded comrade down the difficult slopes of MOUNT PANTANO to the village of PANTANO where casualties could be evacuated to hospitals.  (Source: Fifth Army At The WInter Line: 15 November 1943 - 15 January 1944) 

    • Based on the extent of Marv's injuries (shrapnel to left side of neck, left arm, left leg and bullet wounds to left leg), he was likely taken off MOUNT PANTANO in a similar manner to the village of PANTANO.  And since he mentioned that he dragged himself to an aid station, he probably couldn't walk down the slope of the mountain.

    • "A variety of expedients were adopted to speed the process of evacuation. Casualties from the 34th Division were brought down from Mt. Pantano by litter bearers who lined both sides of the trail and passed litters from hand to hand over their heads.  20 Litter carries ran as long as 12 to 15  hours, with 6-man squads working in relays."  (Source: U.S. Army Medical Department, Office of Medical History, Chapter VI, Salerno to the Gustav Line, pg 240.) 

  • Above Middle: Medic, Pfc. Richard C. Drapper of the 310th Medical Battalion, 85th Infantry Division, dresses the shrapnel wound of a fellow GI. Grande, Italy.  (Source: US National Archives - (SC 202190))

    • I image this is what it might have looked like for Marv because he received similar wounds.​  NF

  • Above Right Army Surgeons operate on wounded soldiers at the Evacuation Hospital. The surgical team in the background perform a brain operation on a patient, and the team in the foreground remove shell fragments from a G.I.'s leg.​  (Source: "Life" magazine)

    • Perhaps this is how it looked like when Marv's initial shrapnel was removed.  Accnording to Marv's Dec. 10, 1943 V-Mail letter, he "had shrapnel removed within a very few hours after I was hit."  N

December 1-27, 135th Infantry, Actions: 

 

Below is an excerpt from “Regimental History of the 135th Infantry” describing the 135th Infantry Regiment's actions from December 1 to 27.

 

By 1 December the 135th was in Division reserve near MONTAQUILLA, and the 133rd was preparing to attack CERASULO on the right, and the 168th Hill 1100, otherwise known as MT. PANTANO.  The 2nd Battalion, 135th, reinforced with additional mortars from the Regiment, supported the Division attack from positions on the high ground to the east of the extending north and south line between SELVONE and MENNELLA.  At 0800 hours, 1 December, the attack opened following a 30-minute artillery preparation, but intense fire from the enemy, including heavy artillery, mortar, and small-arms fire, plus a large number of personnel mines, prevented the two Regiments from attaining their objectives.  The enemy counter-attacked fiercely and prisoners confirmed the presence of the 577th Infantry Regiment, 305th Division, in the 168th sector. 

  • Note: Given that the 2nd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion on December 8 (date Marv was wounded) and given that an officer from the 2nd Battalion was wounded on December 8, perhaps Marv was in the 2nd Battalion.  NF

​

On 3 December General Ryder ordered Company E, 135th, to move to Hill 760, relieving a company of the 168th and becoming attached to that Regiment.

 

During the night of 4-5 December the 135th relieved the 168th on Hill 1100, the 3rd Battalion occupying the north sector with Company E reverting back to its own Regiment.  The 1st Battalion marched over a trail to take over the south sector of the hill, and the 2nd Battalion went into Regimental reserve near Colemacchia[?].  Company D, 2nd Chemical Battalion, formerly attached to the 168th, was attached to the 135th.  The Cannon Company was in a position to support the Regiment and performed an excellent job with its harassing and interdictory fire.  This finally provoked the enemy into retaliation with heavy concentrations of counter-battery, but the fire failed to silence the 75mm pack howitzers.

 

For the next several days there was heavy mortar and artillery fire from both sides with a considerable number of casualties.  The task of the litter bearers was a difficult one, for it took as long as four hours to bring the wounded off MT. PANTANO.  Trench foot continued to plague the men.

 

On 8 December the 2nd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion, and the Anti-Tank Company was given the responsibility of the 2nd Battalion, which went into reserve, of patrolling the main road at Cerreto.

  • Note: As stated previously, I do not know to which Batalion Marv was assigned.  However, given that Marv was wounded on December 8, perhaps he was assigned to the 2nd Battalion.  NF

 

The first phase of the relief of the l35th by elements of the 2nd Morroccan Div. was completed on the night of 9-10 December 1943 at 0305A, 10 Dec. 1943, the 1st and 3rd Bn. of the l35th being relieved first.  At this time the command of the sector passed to the French. The 2 Bn's of the l35th relieved this night made a Road march through FILIONANO and POZZILLI to an assembly area in the vicinity of S. MARIA OLIVETO.  The 3rd Bn. arrived in the assembly area at 06l5A and was the last of the 2 Battalions to arrive.

 

The following night, 10-11 December, the 2nd Bn. was relieved on position by elements of the 2nd Morroccan Div. The relief started at 2000A and was completed at 2l40A. The 2nd Bn. closed into its assembly area at S. MARIA OLIVETO at 0230A. 11 Dec. 1943 Col. Ward remained with the French for 24 hours after the relief had been consummated.  

 

At 2355A, 11 Dec. 1943, the regiment left its assembly area in trucks and traveled to S. ANGELO D'ALIFE, taking the road via VENAFRO.  The last elements of regiment arrived at the bivouac area at 0545A. 12 Dec. 1943 and was rejoined by Col Ward later that day.

 

During the period of inactivity at S. ANGELO D'ALIFE the Regiment went through a period of training and was reconstituted with both personnel and equipment. Also during this time the men were able to secure clean clothing and showers, which most of them had not had since coming up to the front. Entertainment was furnished for their relaxation & enjoyment.

  • Note: The above add further credence to my educated guess that Marv traveled to the Evacuation Hospital in ALIFE.  NF

 

Christmas Day the regiment was alerted for a move back up to the front and plans were immediately laid for movement.  At 0800A, 27 Dec. 1943, advance reconnaissance groups left the 135th are a S. Angelo D’Alife and proceeded by motor to reconnoiter the near area…The year ended with the Regiment posed to attack SAN VITTORE.

​

Below is an excerpt from 34th 'Red Bull' Infantry Divsion: A 3-Part History Based on booklet printed at end of WW2:

​

MOUNT PANTANO – Climbing

 

With the capture of Montaquilla and the clearing of the hill mass between that town and Filignano, a temporary halt was called to the advance. The immense exertions of the attack together with the weather made it necessary for a certain amount of refitting to be done. During this phase the 133rd Infantry, while in Corps reserve, went through a training program while the other two Regiments carried out day and night patrolling so that a continuous flow of information about the enemy was obtained. The German forces who opposed us at this time had been freshly committed for the defense of the outpost line. They consisted of the 305th Infantry Division who had relieved the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division when the pressure was being put upon them. The 305th was commanded by a general with great experience in mountain warfare, and his troops included a number of seasoned soldiers deriving all the advantages which defense in this terrain provides - yet our troops were able not merely to drive the enemy back, but also to inflict upon him very appreciable losses in men and material. Large quantities of ammunition and supplies had been captured in the bunker positions defending the hills, and our artillery, not content with supporting the infantry, had carried out a harassing program on the enemy supply lines, which, according to the German prisoners themselves, had often meant that they enjoyed no food or sleep for as many as four days at a time. 

 

To underline the achievement scored by the 34th Division at this time, it must be remembered that throughout the period of assault, in constant rain, mud, wind and cold, our troops had absolutely no specialized winter equipment. Every man in the Division lived in sodden clothing with no waterproof boots, his feet so cold and wet, that trench foot was a disease almost impossible to avoid. A great effort was made to insure the supply of dry socks to the forward troops but this was not always possible.

 

It was not until 29 November that the offensive was resumed. The 133rd Infantry, relieved from Corps reserve, had entered the right Division sector relieving parachute infantry in the region of Colli. Our line at this time ran roughly north and south, and on the right flank of the 133rd Infantry came the 168th Infantry, while still further to the south stood the 135th Infantry. The plan was to attack to the west with the 168th Infantry making the main effort to secure the dominating mountain of M. Pantano. This hill, over 3300 feet high, consisted of a large mass of bare rock surmounted by four small "pimples" in the shape of a square. Covered routes of approach were virtually absent, and since it was impossible to dig foxholes in the solid rock, the only feasible way in which the infantry could obtain any protection was to pile boulders in front of them or to take advantage of the very few rock walls which laced the slope. The weather continued to be appalling. Low clouds and fog reduced visibility to such a point that frequently enemy positions were by-passed without either side being aware of it. 

 

The assault was launched on a two-regiment front in the face of extremely heavy artillery and mortar fire. The enemy, in command of excellent observation, had taken advantage of the previous few days' respite to register his weapons accurately on all critical approaches. Heavy casualties to our troops were unavoidable, and the progress was slow and bitter. During the fighting the 100th Infantry Battalion, demonstrated that the small physique of its men, was more than compensated for by their courage and tenacity. The attack on M. Pantano made progress and on the morning of 30 November the 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry, had secured the "pimple" at the southwest corner of the square. Throughout the day the enemy launched savage counter-attacks upon this Battalion, but our troops refused to budge. On the following morning dense fog delayed the resumption of the attack since the units could not see each other and control was very difficult. Shortly after noon the fog lifted and as the battalions moved forward the men were hit by severe German fire from well-camouflaged dug-in positions. Our casualties were heavy - within an hour two battalion commanders were lost. The enemy hit back again and again throughout the night and still the position was held. On 1 December a concerted attack by the 133rd and 168th Infantry Regiments was arranged. After a thirty-minute artillery preparation the infantry jumped off, but the advance was extremely slow. The Germans, alert to the vital importance of M. Pantano, were determined not to let it go. Again and again our troops closed with the enemy, and the supply of hand grenades frequently gave out. On one occasion, the Germans, having launched a series of counter-attacks against the 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry, almost succeeded in overrunning one company. Their grenades exhausted, our soldiers tore down the wall, behind which they were sheltering, rock by rock, and threw them at the Germans. The enemy failed to drive us back.

 

Such fighting could not continue indefinitely. After the long and gruelling advance from the first Volturno crossing, culminated now by the fiercest fighting they had known, our troops were nearly exhausted. Furthermore, snow had begun to fall and our troops, still without winter clothing, suffered agonies from the cold. A man who became wounded often had to lie for hours without attention until darkness enabled medical aidmen to evacuate him, a process which took hours of difficult and dangerous climbing down the steep rock face of the hill.

 

The assault was broken off and the Division contented itself with active patrolling. We had succeeded in maintaining our foothold on the top of M. Pantano and held one out of the four peaks. On the night of 8-9 December, the 2nd Moroccan Division began the relief of our worn-out troops and on 12 December this was complete. After 76 successive days of contact with the enemy, the 34th Division withdrew for rest, training, and replacements to the area of S. Angelo d'Alife, which it had captured on 23 October. 

 

The entire Division had performed outstandingly well during the period. The War Department awarded a unit citation to the 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry, for its performance on M. Pantano.

​

December 10, 1943:  Marv sent a V-Mail letter to his family informing them he had been injured.  The sender's address is from a hospital (name of hospital was blackened out), APO 34 (Army Post Office 34), c/o Postmaster New York, N.Y. (APO 34 means that the letter was from overseas to the N.Y., N.Y. postmaster for delivery to its final destination).  The letter was dated December 10, 1943.  Although the name of the hospital and its exact location are unknown, given the date and APO number, it's likely the V-Mail was sent from an Evacuation Hospital in Italy assigned to the 34th Infantry Division.

December 10, 1943

 

Dear Mom and Dad

 

I hope this reaches you before the official notice does, because official notices are always so grim and incomplete and lead you to worry unnecessarily.  I was wounded, not seriously, the other day.  I know you’d rather have me tell you than try to keep it away from you.  I know some fellows that are sorry that they didn’t write as soon as possible.  And besides, it’s nothing terrible.  I don’t want you to worry one bit about it.  I’m having the very best of medical care and had shrapnel removed within a very few hours after I was hit.  So that you won’t have visions of something horrible or beyond repair I’ll tell you exactly where the wounds are.  There’s a small dent in my left arm and one in my left legs and a scratch on my neck.  When the tissue heals there will be no effect whatsoever on any part of the boy.

 

The thing that makes me mad is that it’s going to take a few days longer for my mail to catch up to me.  Let Dot know will you, because it’s hard to write in bed.

 

Keep the tread mill going and stay healthy.

 

Love to all,

Marv.

December 30, 1943: Marv sent a Happy New Year Postcard to his family from 33d General Hospital, Bizerte, Tunisia, and the Adjutant General sent a Western Union telegram to Marv’s mother informing her that he was wounded in action in Italy on December 8, 1943.

  • Above left: Postcard from Marv, 33d General Hospital, APO 424 (Bizerte, Tunisia), date stamped Dec. 30, 1943.

  • Above right: Western Union Telegram form The Adjutant General informing family that Marv was wounded in action.  (note: Slightly wounded turned out to be 50% disability according to Marv's disability pension.)

Above: Miscellaneous newspaper clippings pasted in the scrapbook. 

  • Note: The top left clipping mistakenly printed Marvin's name as "Martin."   The clipping is from The Detroit News, January 12, 1944.  To view the entire article, click here. NF

  • Note: While neither my sisters nor I know who William Smith was, the article on the right states he went overseas in Sept 1943 (as did Marv), and to Italy two months later.  Therefore, if this was typical, Marv may not have arrived in Italy until the end of November 1943.   Also, could William Smith be the "Smitty" who Marv referred to in his letter dated August 16, 1943?  "If Smitty is still here, rush his address to me and I'll try to look him up."  Also, according to the article, William Smith lived on Lycaste avenue; Marv and his family lived at 2193 Lycaste before they moved to Washtenaw St.  NF

February 8, 1944: Marv sent a Valentine Card to his mother from 33rd General Hospital, Bizerte, Tunisia.

Infantry Medical Care

Marv did not talk much about being wounded or what happened from the time he was wounded until he returned to the United States.  This is what is known:

  • His daughter Joni remembers Marv saying that he was in "fox hole" with two other soldiers when he was hit and that the other two soldiers stood up but he did not.  

  • His daughter Nancy remembers Marv saying that the two soldiers who were with him when he was hit were killed.  Also, he told her that he "dragged" himself to an aid station and was laying on the floor in some sort of chapel.

  • All of his daughters remember Marv saying he was on a hospital ship; Joni remembers Marv saying that the nurses on the hospital ship were "very nice."

  • All of his daughters remember Marv saying that he was in North Africa, but they are not sure if he was talking about before or after he was in Italy or both times.

  • Marv bought a tan leather wallet in Africa, according to his daughter Susan, but there are no more details about the wallet.

    • Note: On the cover is the word ""Maroc," which is French for Morocco.  At first I thought the Marv stayed in a hospital in French Morroco, which would fit with burying a Moroccan wallet; however, the hospital (33rd General Hospital) that awarded Marv his purple heart was based in Tunisia, so questions remain about the wallet and where Marv was hospitalized: (1) Did Marv buy the wallet  in French Morroco?  (2) Was Marv ever in French Morocco?  (3) Could Marv have bought the wallet in Tunisia even though the cover design includes the word "Maroc"?  (4)  Is there still a possiblity that Marv was in a hospital in Morocco?  NF

  • According to Marv's "Enlisted Record and Report of Separation," he departed from overseas on March 8, 1944 and arrived in the United States on March 19, 1944.  Therefore, he spent three months overseas after he was wounded.

​

Note: Given the above memories and facts and based on how medical care happened during World War II, the following is an educated guess about what happened after Marv was wounded.  NF

​

The Chain of Evacuation: Wartime medical treatment occurred on muddy battlefields under fire, in tent hospitals only miles from the front, and in sterile stateside hospitals.  A complex chain moved patients to where they could best be treated. At all points along this chain, decisions were made regarding when to treat, when to return to duty, and when to evacuate further to the rear.  

​

Organic Medical Units: These units were attached to combat units and followed them into battle.

  • Battlefield: Medics performed first aid and moved the wounded to the aid station, often under fire.  

    • Note: Marv said that after being hit he dragged himself to an aid station.​  NF

  • Battalion aid station: About one mile from front. Physicians and medics adjusted splints and dressings, administered plasma and morphine. Soldiers also reported to the aid station for treatment of minor illnesses or mild combat fatigue.

    • Note: Based on the description of the Moroccan litter bearers, perhaps there was an aid station in the village of PANTANO.  NF

  • Collecting station: About two miles from the front, near the regiment command post. Further adjustment of splints and dressings, administration of plasma, treatment of shock.

  • Clearing station: About four to ten miles from front. Here they treated shock and minor wounds, and grouped patients in ambulance loads for transport to field hospitals.

​

The following excerpt from History of the Office of Medical History, provides a description of what conditions were like during the time and in the area where Marv was injured.

 

Battlefield Evacuation - As in the Volturno campaign, the primary medical problem of the Winter Line was evacuation of casualties from the battlefields.  The difficulties inherent in carrying wounded men down steep, boulder-strewn slopes, often in total darkness, were aggravated by cold and almost incessant rain or snow.  Main highways were frequently under enemy fire and were overburdened with a steady stream of combat equipment.  Secondary roads and trails were so deep in mud that ambulances could rarely come within five miles of the lines.

 

All available litter bearers of the corps medical battalions were assigned to the divisions, and these were periodically supplemented by assignment of combat personnel.  Toward the end of the year, AFHQ authorized the addition of 100 litter bearers to each organic medical battalion.  Continuous replacements were necessary at all levels of the medical service. Litter bearers were exposed to the same hazards as the combat troops.  Many of them camped along the evacuation routes, but without the protective clothing worn by the infantrymen.  Casualties among medical officers were also high, but the only available replacements were men from fixed hospitals in the base sections who lacked both battle experience and conditioning.  Collecting companies were used sparingly, and where used were reduced to one medical officer each. Medical officers of the corps medical battalions were often detached for duty with the divisional medical units.

 

A variety of expedients were adopted to speed the process of evacuation. Casualties from the 34th Division were brought down from Mt. Pantano by litter bearers who lined both sides of the trail and passed litters from hand to hand over their heads.  Litter carries ran as long as 12 to 15  hours, with 6-man squads working in relays.  The 109th Medical Battalion reported using 16 such squads to move casualties over a 5-mile stretch on 12 January 1944.  On the longer routes, aid stations were set up along the way to supply first aid, plasma, and hot drinks, and to give walking wounded a chance to rest.  The 120th Medical Battalion used pack mules to bring out trench-foot cases, and experimented with a mule-carried litter, apparently unaware of the similar experiments carried out by the 9th Medical Battalion in Tunisia and Sicily. Experiments were also made with a modified breeches buoy, improvised from an equipment line, for lowering casualties down precipitous slopes.

Above: Organic Medical Units: Battlefield First Aid, Battlefield Aid Station, Collecting Station, Clearing Station, and Medical Transports

Note: Click on photo for enlarged version and caption.

Mobile Hospitals:  Field hospitals (400 beds) and evacuation hospitals (400 or 750 beds) arrived within a few days of an invasion and followed the Army, staying about thirty miles behind the front.  

​

These hospitals relied on mobility. They usually used canvas tents, but also used schools, barracks, hospital buildings, hotels, Mediterranean villas, and an Italian stadium. A few days before a move, the hospital stopped admitting patients and evacuated their current patients to other hospitals. They packed their equipment and personnel into trucks, advanced, set up, and were ready to admit patients within hours. They were complete hospitals with nursing care, surgical and medical wards, X-ray, laboratory, and pharmacy.

 

When ambulances arrived, triage officers sent patients to pre-op, medical, shock, or evacuation wards as needed. Surgical teams worked twelve hours on, then twelve hours off.

​

In the European Theater (England, France, Belgium, Germany), the field hospitals stayed closer to the front, with the evacuation hospitals further to the rear. In the Mediterranean Theater (North Africa, Sicily, Italy, southern France), field hospitals and evacuation hospitals were used interchangeably. Both theaters practiced “leapfrogging” as the front advanced—hospital A would pass hospital B, then hospital B would pass hospital A. This reduced the frequency of moves.

  • Field Hospitals: Within thirty miles of clearing station. Ideally, the wounded arrived within one hour of injury. Surgery was performed for the most severe cases.

  • Evacuation Hospitals: Treated illnesses and less urgent surgical cases. Patients could be reconditioned here to return to the front.

    • Note: Based on the nearness of the evacuation hospital in ALIFE to the village of PANTANO and given that the 34th Division Infantry traveled to ALIFE after they were relieved on MOUNT PANTANO beginning Dec. 8-9, it's likely that Marv went to the ALIFE evacuation hospital.  Also, ALIFE is located about 31 miles southeast of the village of PANTANO and Marv wrote in a letter to his parents that shrapnel was removed within a few hours after he was hit.  So given the timeline of shrapnel removal and distance from where he was hit to the Alife evacuation hospital, it's conceivable that the shrapnel was removed at evacuation hospital in Alife.   Additionally, the other nearest evacuation hospital (Varano) was located on the other side of the Volturno River from where Marv was wounded.  Alife and Mount Pantano are located on the same side of the river; this probably made travel to Alife easier.  NF

Above: Evacuation Hospitals

These Evacuation Hospitals were probably very similar to the Evacuation Hospital that Marv was likely sent to.  Based on how long it took to sail from Oran, Algeria, to Salerno, it was probably an overnight sailing.

Transport to Fixed Hospital.  From an evacuation hospital in Italy, Marv traveled by a hospital ship to the fixed hospital 33d General Hospital, Bizerte, Tunisia (North Africa).

  • Note: I made this conclusion because of the following facts and information:

    • On December 30, 1944, Marv sent a Happy New Year Postcard to his family from 33rd General Hospital, APO 424, date stamped Dec. 30, 1943. 

    • On Feb. 8, 1944, Marv sent a Valentine Day Postcard to his mother that has cancellation stamp A.P.O. 424.

    • On February 17, 1944, the 33d General Hospital issued General Order Number 11  that has Marv's name on a list of Purple Heart Awardees.

    • In an account of a WW II nurse who worked at the 33d General Hospital in Bizerte, Tunisia, I learned that the 33d General Hospital was part of the 5th Army.

    • A newspaper story of another WW II nurse who worked at the 33d General Hospital stated that, "Sandstorms, gooey mud, and cold were part of her personal life at Bizerte..."  NF

​

Hospital ships operated under the terms of the Hague Convention, which meant that those vessels could carry only military personnel on patient status accompanied by attending Medical and Transportation Corps personnel. The white hospital ships with large red crosses painted on either side were forbidden to carry cargo of any kind and were subject to enemy inspection at any time. Nevertheless, the Axis Powers did not always spare hospital ships, which were bombed in at least three different incidents. Army nurses were wounded when the Germans bombed hospital ships during the Allied invasions of Italy and Anzio.  In the Pacific, Japanese pilots attacked the USS Comfort off Leyte Island in April 1945, seriously damaging the ship and killing twenty-nine people, including six Army nurses.

Above: U.S. Hospital Ships

The U.S. Army Hospital Ship "Shamrock" operated in the Mediterranean between September 1943 and February 1944.  It was the only Army hospital ship normally engaged in transporting patients from Italy to North Africa. 

  • Note: Given above and given that Marv was wounded Dec. 8, 1943, he was evacuated from Italy to the 33rd General Hospital in Tunisia, and the Shamrock transported 33rd General Hospital staff for their move from Tunisia to Italy, it's likely that he traveled on the Shamrock from Italy to North Africa.  NF

Fixed Hospitals. The station hospitals (250, 500, or 750 beds), general hospitals (1000 beds), and convalescent hospitals (2000 or 3000 beds) were set up far from the front to keep patients safe from danger, but also to keep them in the theater, which made it easier to return the soldiers to duty. 

  • Station Hospitals: Usually attached to a military base, designed to treat illnesses and injuries among personnel stationed at that base.

  • General Hospitals: Large facilities where patients received long-term treatment, sometimes grouped in large complexes. Some of the general hospitals were specialized for certain types of wounds or illnesses, such as for craniocerebral, spine, eye, chest, or neuropsychiatric care.

  • Convalescent Hospitals: Designed for rehabilitation of the severely wounded soldier who would receive a medical discharge. This type of hospital was a World War II innovation.

​

In each theater of operations, fixed hospitals operated in what was called the “Communications Zone.”  In the European Theater, the COMZ was originally in England, then as the Allies approached the German border, the COMZ extended to include Normandy and Belgium.  In the Mediterranean Theater, Morocco served as the first COMZ, then Algeria.  When the Allies invaded Sicily and Italy, North Africa was the COMZ, and as the front advanced, the COMZ was established in the Naples area of southern Italy. In the Pacific, fixed hospitals were first established in Hawaii and Australia, then followed into secured regions.

​

Patients were evacuated from the field to station and general hospitals in the zone of communications via hospital trains, hospital ships, and aircraft.

​

33rd General Hospital, Bizerte, Tunisia.  Marv was  evacuated from Italy to the 33rd General Hospital, Bizerte, Tunisia (North Africa).  

​

Above: The 33d General Hospital, Bizerte, Tunisia, and Scenes of the Area.

 

Below are excerpts from 33d General Hospital: Unit History.

  • On 15 September 1943, just one month after its arrival in North Africa, the first real load of patients was received at the 33d General Hospital. They numbered 275 and were casualties from the Salerno landings in Italy (Operation “Avalanche," 9 September 9, 1943). 

  • One day four ward tents appeared on the Hospital grounds. They formed a “Triage Center”, which became the nucleus for the entire hospital evacuation system of Bizerte, Tunisia. Not too far from the docks, only one mile from Sidi Ahmed Airport, and 300 yards from the 2670 Motor Ambulance Company (Provisional). It soon started operating with additional support of 6 Nurses and 6 Enlisted Men on DS from the 33d General. All the sick and wounded evacuated by either air transport (through the 802d Medical Air Evacuation Transport Squadron) or Hospital Ship (through Bizerte with assistance of the 8th Port Surgeon’s Office) from Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, passed through the Center as soon as they arrived in North Africa. Incoming patients were sorted at the Triage Center according to their ailments and transferred by ambulance to hospitals specializing in the proper treatment for such cases. All neuro-surgical, maxillo-facial, spinal cord, cranio-cerebral, and eye injury cases were received and treated at the 33d, which became specialized in such cases.

    • Note: The above account confirms that hospital ships disembarked wounded soldiers at Bizerte, and given that Marv's condition would not have been critical, it's very likely that he was evacuated from Italy directly to Bizerte on a hospital ship.  NF

  • 14,000 V-Mail greetings forms were used by the Hospital’s patients and personnel during the Season. They had been mimeographed from a Christmas drawing made by an artist patient. Although news of another movement and change of station was known, the Yule-tide spirit started taking over and some special ideas were worked out for the coming Christmas period. Within the next few days the Recreation Tent under control of the American Red Cross became the base of operations. Ambulatory patients swarmed in and out, exchanging ideas or requests for suggestions for decorating the Wards. Many a use was made of cotton, tongue depressors, red flannel bandages, and toilet paper, but no one really objected. Decoration and gift kits had meanwhile arrived, sourcing a mass production of gifts and their appropriate wrapping. A “Sad Sack” was made of fatigue cloth and stuffed with sand, with head, hands, and feet carved out of G.I. soap. A Christmas Show was put on by a group of young RAF men, some of whom had been former patients of the 33d. They concluded with Christmas Carols and other songs with the audience joining them. The unit’s Chaplains led a group of singers made up of Doctors, Nurses, and EM, and the ARC staff distributed their gifts together with candy, cookies, and cigarettes to the patients. Christmas Day – 25 December 1943 – was really celebrated the traditional way with a turkey dinner and all its trimmings. The US Navy contributed a large supply of hundreds of little gifts containing cigarettes, candy, playing cards, etc. brought to the Hospital by a group of fourteen sailors from a nearby Naval Base.

    • Note: Marv was likely evacuated from Italy to the 33d General Hospital during the above Christmas season because he was wounded December 8, 1943 and he sent a Happy New Year postcard to his family from 33rd General Hospital, APO 424, date stamped Dec. 30, 1943. 

    • At the stroke of midnight, 1 May 1944, no further patients were admitted to the 33d General Hospital. Those remaining were transferred or evacuated and then began the rat race of dismantling, crating and packing equipment and supplies in preparation for a change of station. The last patients finally left on 9 May 1944. It must be noted that the total number of patients admitted in North Africa amounted to 10,307.

  • On 19 May 1944, most of the Officers, all the Nurses, and 140 Enlisted Men heaved their barracks bags onto lined up trucks, climbed in, and began their final descent of the Hill. At the docks in Bizerte they boarded the USAHS “Shamrock”, Hospital Ship to the tune of their own band.

    • Note: The above account gives further credence to my idea that Marv traveled from Italy to North Africa aboard the U.S. Army Ship "Shamrock.​"  NF

​

  • Above left: Photo of Marv.  While the location and date are unknown, it is likely Bizerte, Tunisia because there is a splint-like device on his left arm. 

    • Note: I remember him saying that he could feel the nerve as it grew down his arm.  This probably meant that he had direct damage to axons within a nerve or nerves, and as the axons regenerated he regained feeling and movement.  NF)

  • Above right: According to his family, Marv got this wallet in Africa.  Based on my research, he probably bought it in Bizerte, Tunisia while he was at the 33d General Hospital. 

Above: Photos included because of the similarities to the one of Marv with the palm trees.

  • Above Left: Officers posting in front of palm tree in Bizerte, Tunisia, September - October 1943.

  • Above Right: Two Nurses of the 204th Medical Hospital Ship Company in North Africa, 1943.​

Above: YouTube video of Tunisia, including a few scenes of Bizerte.

Summary of Troop Losses,

135th infantry Regiment, 34th Division

November and December, 1943

November 1-30, 1943, 135th Infantry, Losses in Action: Below is a summary of losses clipped from  Regimental History for Period 1 November through 30 November 1943, page 45. 

  • Note: Only the names of the officers are listed.  NF

December 1-31, 1943, 135th Infantry, Losses in Action: Below is a summary of losses clipped from  Regimental History for Period 1 December to 31 December 1943,  page 62. 

  • Note: While only the officers are named, assuming Marv was assigned to the 135th Infantry he was part of the number of enlisted men wounded in action on December 8 (94 wounded).  The report lists the following names of officers who were killed or wounded on December 8.  NF

    • Killed in Action: Lt. Perry, Warren S., Co. "B"

    • Wounded in Action: 2nd Lt. Pritchard, John B., Co. "B"

    • Wounded in Action: 1st Lt. Dodge, Donald J. Co. "D"

  • Note: While the total number of enlisted men killed, wounded, missing in action for December (118 casualties) is less than it was for November (142 casualties), the casualty rate was higher in December because the entire 34th Division was relieved during December 8 and 9 and didn't return to action until after Christmas. NF

Recognition of U.S. Actions on Mount Pantano

In 2004, the Committee for the Recognition of US Actions on Mount Pantano was formed to "inform, educate and advance the knowledge of this forgotten battle."  They began by lobbying for a substantial and permanent monument site to be placed at the foot of Mount Pantano honoring the 34th Division on the 70th anniversary of the battle in 2013.

​

On August 14, 2010, a memorial plaque was placed on the summit of Mount Pantano (Knob 1) to honor the brave men of the 168th Regimental Combat team (34th Division) who fought and died defending Mount Pantano from November 29 - December 4, 1943, and the following poem was read on the mountain top.

​

Mount Pantano

(by Phil Mckinley)

 

White clouds grazed like sheep across Pantano’s jagged crest,

Herded by the shepherd wind, nor did they wander,

For each kept his appointed course.  Abreast

They nibbled at the Alpine peak, bleak and somber.

But that was yesterday.

Today, a regiment holds the rocky peak,

A battered regiment – bleeding and weak

But to Hitler’s bastards – defiant still.

The orders read: “ Take, secure, and hold this hill.”

Tonight the regiment lies cursing, dying

In mud and snow, but still defying.

Mount Pantano, this battle streamer reads.

To the battle flag, attach it well!

It represents four days in hell.

​

The Committee planned to will continue to lobby and petition for a substantial and permanent monument honoring the 168th & 135th Regiments of the 34th Division for their actions on Mount Pantano in 1943. 

​

For more information, go to http://109thengineers34thdivision.blogspot.com/2010/09/committee-for-recognition-of-us-actions_21.html

​

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